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I. INTRODUCTION 
Tribal sovereign immunity has been a core principle of Indian law 
and United States-tribal interactions since first contact between 
European and native peoples.1 For centuries, this principle has 
dictated that Indian tribes, like sovereign nations, are immune from 
legal action as “distinct, independent, political communities retaining 
their original rights.”2 In Bay Mills Indian Community v. Michigan,3 
the Supreme Court will determine whether tribal sovereign immunity 
prevents the State of Michigan from seeking an injunction in federal 
court against a federally recognized Indian tribe for alleged violations 
of the Indian Gaming Regulation Act occurring outside of “Indian 
lands.”4 In answering this question the Court can comport with long-
standing precedent by finding that tribal sovereign immunity bars the 
desired action. Alternatively, the Court could find that tribal 
sovereign immunity does not protect the Bay Mills tribe from 
Michigan’s suit, marking a shift in judicial approach on the issue—a 
 
* J.D. Candidate, Duke University School of Law, 2015. 
 1.  See Andrea M. Seielstad, The Recognition and Evolution of Tribal Sovereign Immunity 
Under Federal Law: Legal, Historical, and Normative Reflections on a Fundamental Aspect of 
American Indian Sovereignty, 37 TULSA L. REV. 661, 683 (2002) (“[Sovereign immunity] 
emerged from a tradition of early European contact in which discourse, commercial trade and 
intercourse, negotiation, and treaty-making regulated interactions and relationships between 
Indian nations and their people, on the one hand, and European nations and their colonial 
settlers, on the other hand.”).  
 2.  See id. at 689 (citation omitted).  
 3. Michigan v. Bay Mills Indian Cmty., No. 12-515 (U.S. argued Dec. 2, 2013).  
 4.  See Brief for Petitioner at i, Michigan v. Bay Mills Indian Cmty., No. 12-515 (U.S. Aug. 
30, 2013). 
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shift which could ripple through a variety of tribal concerns. For both 
legal and policy reasons, the Court should uphold the ruling of the 
Sixth Circuit and determine that tribal sovereign immunity bars 
Michigan’s desired injunction. 
II. FACTUAL BACKGROUND 
A. Background 
The Bay Mills Indian Community (Bay Mills) is a federally 
recognized American Indian tribe with a reservation and tribal offices 
in Michigan’s Upper Peninsula.5 Bay Mills entered into a Tribal-State 
compact with Michigan in 1993 pursuant to the requirements of the 
Indian Gaming Regulatory Act (IGRA).6 The Tribal-State compact 
contractually outlined the types of gambling in which Bay Mills would 
engage and the manner in which its casinos would be staffed and 
operated.7 In that same year, Bay Mills adopted a tribal gaming 
ordinance and created a Tribal Gaming Commission both issue 
licenses to license and regulate casinos operated by the Tribe.8 Since 
that time, Bay Mills has “continuously operated at least one casino on 
its reservation.”9 
In 1997, Congress passed the Michigan Indian Land Claims 
Settlement Act10 to compensate Michigan Indian tribes for lands 
ceded to Michigan for which the tribes did not receive fair 
compensation.11 The Act distributed funds to tribes in a variety of 
ways.12 Bay Mills divided its compensation, placing twenty percent 
into a land trust, the earnings from which would “be used exclusively 
for improvements on tribal land or the consolidation and 
enhancement of tribal landholdings.”13 With earnings from this trust, 
 
 5.  Id. at 12.  
 6.  Id. at 13.  
 7.  A Compact Between the Bay Mills Indian Community and the State of Michigan 
Providing for the Conduct of Tribal Class III Gaming by the Bay Mills Indian Community (Aug. 
20, 1993), http://www.baymills.org/resources/BMIC-MI%20Compact.pdf. 
 8.  Brief for Petitioner, supra note 4, at 13.  
 9.  Id. 
 10.  Michigan v. Bay Mills Indian Cmty., 695 F.3d 406, 410 (6th Cir. 2012), cert. granted, 133 
S. Ct. 2850 (June 24, 2013) (No. 12-515). 
 11.  Brief for Respondent at 10–11, Michigan v. Bay Mills Indian Cmty., No. 12-515 (U.S. 
Oct. 24, 2013). 
 12.  See id. at 11 (“The [Michigan Indian Land Claims Settlement] Act distributed each 
tribe’s funds differently, and tribes individually participated in developing the substance and 
form of their respective distribution plans.”).  
 13.  Id. (citation omitted).  
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in August 2010, Bay Mills purchased forty acres of land in Vanderbilt, 
Michigan.14 In the following months, Bay Mills erected a casino on this 
land.15 On October 29, 2010, the Bay Mills Gaming Commission 
granted a license for class III gaming activities to the Vanderbilt 
casino.16 Class III gaming covers all gambling not specified in class I 
(traditional tribal games) or class II (bingo and some card games).17 
On November 3, Bay Mills began class III gaming activity in the form 
of electronic gaming devices at the Vanderbilt casino.18 
B.  Procedural History 
On December 16, 2010, the Michigan State Attorney General 
ordered Bay Mills to close the Vanderbilt casino on the ground that it 
was operating in violation of Michigan’s gambling laws.19 On 
December 21, Michigan filed suit against Bay Mills in the Western 
District of Michigan for violation of the Michigan-Bay Mills compact 
and state gambling laws.20 One day later, another Michigan tribe, the 
Little Traverse Bay Bands of Odawa Indians (Little Traverse), filed 
suit against Bay Mills for violation of the Tribal-State compact.21  
Little Traverse, supported by Michigan, moved for a preliminary 
injunction against the operation of the Vanderbilt casino.22 The district 
court granted this preliminary injunction,23 and Bay Mills filed an 
interlocutory appeal to the Sixth Circuit.24 
On August 15, 2012, the Sixth Circuit ruled that tribal sovereign 
immunity barred the State’s action, vacating the preliminary 
injunction, and remanding the case to the district court.25 At this point, 
Little Traverse voluntarily sought dismissal of its claim while 
Michigan filed a petition for certiorari to the United States Supreme 
Court.26 On June 24, 2013, the petition for certiorari was granted27 and 
 
 14.  Bay Mills Indian Cmty., 695 F.3d at 410. 
 15.  Brief for Respondent supra note 11, at 11. 
 16.  Id. at 13. 
 17.  Brief for Petitioner, supra note 4, at 5.  
 18.  Brief for Respondent, supra note 11, at 13.  
 19.  Brief for Petitioner, supra note 4, at 13. 
 20.  Michigan v. Bay Mills Indian Cmty., 695 F.3d 406, 410 (6th Cir. 2012). 
 21.  Id.  
 22.  Id.  
 23.  Brief for Petitioner, supra note 4, at 14.  
 24.  Brief for Respondent, supra note 11, at 15. 
 25.  Bay Mills Indian Cmty., 695 F.3d at 416. 
 26.  See Brief for Respondent, supra note 11, at 16–17. 
 27.  Michigan v. Bay Mills Indian Cmty., 133 S. Ct. 2850 (2013). 
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oral argument was held on December 2, 2013.28 
III. LEGAL BACKGROUND 
A. Tribal Sovereign Immunity 
The origin of the doctrine of tribal sovereign immunity predates 
the European arrival to North America, when Native American tribes 
conducted affairs as independent nations.29 Throughout colonization 
and the early years of the American Republic, Britain, and 
subsequently the United States, interacted with the tribes as 
sovereigns through “nation-to-nation diplomacy and treaty-making.”30 
This meant that tribes, like a state or the federal government, enjoyed 
immunity from almost all forms of legal action.31 Despite this long 
historical understanding of the sovereignty of American Indian tribes, 
the legal basis of tribal sovereign immunity comes not from the 
Constitution, but from judicial decisions.32 The basic framework of 
tribal sovereign immunity was laid down in a trilogy of opinions from 
the Marshall Court, which, when taken together, recognizes the tribes 
as “domestic dependent nations” not subject to the authority of the 
state in which they reside and whose land rights can only be 
abrogated by federal authority.33 
 
 
 28.  See Transcript of Oral Argument at 1, Michigan v. Bay Mills Indian Cmty., No. 12-515 
(U.S. Dec. 2, 2013). 
 29.  See Seielstad, supra note 1, at 683 (“[T]he concept of tribal sovereignty predates the 
ratification of the Constitution and formation of the United States. It arose out of a history in 
which distinct communities of American Indian peoples lived, created institutions and systems, 
and governed themselves, sharing territories within North America prior to European 
contact.”).  
 30.  Id. at 684.  
 31.  See id. at 662–63 (“[Sovereign immunity] protects the federal government as well as 
the states from nonconsensual suit, except in certain narrowly prescribed 
circumstances. Sovereign immunity also has been recognized under federal law with respect to 
foreign nation-states and American Indian nation-tribes, entities that are external to the 
constitutional system of government.”).  
 32.  See Brief for Petitioner, supra note 4, at 3 (“Indian tribes have no rights under the 
Unites States Constitution to any attributes of sovereignty. . . . As a result, Congress has the 
authority to override the judicially created doctrine of tribal sovereign immunity.”).  
 33.  See Seielstad, supra note 1, at 685–88. Seielstad discusses three cases which hold 
respectively: (1) that Native American tribes are domestic, dependent nations with sovereign 
control of land subject to only federal abrogation, Worcester v. Georgia, 30 U.S. 515, 561 (1832), 
(2) that Native American tribes are not subject to the jurisdiction of the states in which they are 
located, Cherokee Nation v. Georgia, 30 U.S. 1, 19–20 (1831), and (3) that Native American 
tribes have the “legal and moral right to retain possession and occupancy of tribal land.” 
Johnson v. MacIntosh, 21 U.S. 543, 574 (1823). 
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From this origin, during the second half of the 20th century, the 
courts developed a strong federal common law regarding tribal 
sovereign immunity.34 The core principle of this common law is: “an 
Indian tribe is subject to suit only where Congress has authorized the 
suit or the tribe has waived its immunity.”35 For Congress to abrogate 
tribal sovereign immunity, it “must ‘unequivocally’ express that 
purpose.”36 Similarly, a tribal waiver of sovereign immunity must be 
“clear.”37 Thus, tribal sovereign immunity bars all suits against Indian 
tribes except for the limited circumstances where the tribe itself 
waives immunity or Congress clearly and expressly abrogates such 
immunity. 
B. The Indian Gaming Regulation Act 
1. Origins of Federal Regulation of Indian Gaming 
In the 1960s and ‘70s, Indian tribes across the nation began to take 
advantage of their immunity from state regulation by opening 
gambling establishments.38 Some states went to great lengths to shut 
down these tribal gaming operations, even arresting people suspected 
of gambling as they left tribal territory in an attempt to dissuade 
patronage.39 In 1987, the question of states’ ability “to shut down or 
regulate Indian bingo halls and casinos”40 was taken up by the 
Supreme Court in California v. Cabazon Band of Mission Indians.41 In 
Cabazon, the Court determined that states could not regulate tribal 
gambling operations because of “compelling federal and tribal 




 34.  See Seielstad, supra note 1, at 694 (“Between 1940 and 1998, the Supreme Court first 
named, then clarified, refined and firmly established, the doctrine of tribal immunity as a 
principle of federal common law.”).  
 35.  Kiowa Tribe of Okla. v. Mfg. Techs, Inc., 523 U.S. 751, 754 (1998).  
 36.  C & L Enters., Inc. v. Citizen Band Potawatomi Indian Tribe of Okla., 532 U.S. 411, 
418 (2001) (citing Santa Clara Pueblo v. Martinez, 436 U.S. 49, 58 (1978)) (citation omitted).  
 37.  Okla. Tax Comm’n. v. Citizen Band Potawatomi Tribe of Okla., 498 U.S. 505, 509 
(1991).  
 38. Matthew L.M. Fletcher, Bringing Balance to Indian Gaming 44 HARV. J. ON LEGIS. 39, 
45 (2007) (specifically identifying California, Florida, Maine, New York, and Wisconsin as the 
first locations for Indian gaming parlors). 
 39.  Id. at 46. 
 40.  Id. at 47. 
 41.  480 U.S. 202 (1987). 
 42.  Id. at 221–22. 
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In response, the following year Congress passed the IGRA in an 
attempt to provide a consistent, stable framework for state regulation 
of Indian gaming activity.43 First, the IGRA created the National 
Indian Gaming Commission (NIGC) to serve as a federal regulator of 
tribal gaming activities and enforcer of the IGRA.44 Second, the 
IGRA defined three classes of Indian gaming.45 Class I includes 
traditional Indian games of chance over which the tribes have 
exclusive regulatory authority.46 Class II gaming includes high-stakes 
bingo for which the NIGC must issue licenses without further 
regulation.47 Class III gaming activity includes all other gaming, such 
as slot machines and card games.48 No tribe can participate in class III 
gaming activity unless they have entered into a Tribal-State compact 
with the state in which the tribal lands are located and such activity is 
legal in that state.49 
2. Finding Jurisdiction Under the Provisions of the IGRA 
The provisions of the IGRA most important to Bay Mills are § 
2710,50 the gaming ordinance that covers class III gaming activity, and 
§ 1166, which explains application of state law and enforcement 
authority under the IGRA.51 Under § 2710(d)(7)(A)(ii), “[t]he United 
States district courts shall have jurisdiction over any cause of action 
initiated by a State or Indian tribe to enjoin a class III gaming activity 
located on Indian lands and conducted in violation of any Tribal-State 
compact . . . that is in effect.”52 
The Sixth, Tenth, and Eleventh circuits are divided over the limits 
of jurisdiction provided by this provision has created a three-way 
circuit split between the Sixth, Tenth, and Eleventh Circuits.53 Two 
 
 43.  See Fletcher, supra note 38, at 45–51 (giving a brief history of the fragmented nature of 
Indian gaming regulation prior to the IGRA and a synopsis of congressional intent in passing 
the Act). 
 44.  Id. at 53.  
 45.  Id. at 51. 
 46.  Id.  
 47.  Id. 
 48.  Id. at 52.  
 49.  See Brief for Respondent, supra note 11, at 7 (citing 25 U.S.C. § 2710(d)(1)(C), (d)(3)) 
(2006)).  
 50.  25 U.S.C.A. § 2710(d)(7)(A)(ii) (West 2014).  
 51.  18 U.S.C.A. § 1166 (West 2014).  
 52.  25 U.S.C.A. § 2710(d)(7)(A)(ii).  
 53.  See Michigan v. Bay Mills Indian Cmty., 695 F.3d 406, 415 (6th Cir. 2012) (holding that 
§ 2710 of the IGRA only waives tribal sovereign immunity when all of its textual prerequisites 
are satisfied), cert. granted, 133 S. Ct. 2850 (June 24, 2013); Mescalero Apache Tribe v. New 
Mexico, 131 F.3d 1379, 1385 (10th Cir. 1997) (“IGRA waived tribal sovereign immunity in the 
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jurisdictional questions stem from § 2710(d)(7)(A)(ii): (1) whether 
the language of the provision itself confers broad subject matter 
jurisdiction to the courts, and (2) whether any dispute arising under 
the IGRA would be a matter for federal question jurisdiction. These 
two jurisdictional questions, though important in lower court analysis 
of the case at bar, has been conceded by the Respondent and 
therefore will not be considered by the Supreme Court or further 
addressed in this analysis.54 
Section 1166 reads in relevant part that under federal law, “all 
State laws pertaining to the licensing, regulation, or prohibition of 
gambling . . . shall apply in Indian country in the same manner and to 
the same extent as such laws apply elsewhere in the State.”55 It 
continues, “[w]hoever in Indian country is guilty of an act or omission 
involving gambling . . . which . . . would be punishable if committed or 
omitted within the jurisdiction of the State . . . shall be guilty of a like 
offense and subject to a like punishment.”56 
Finally, § 1166 grants the United States “exclusive jurisdiction over 
criminal prosecutions of violations of State gambling laws that are 
made applicable under this section to Indian country.”57 This statute 
provides an important jurisdictional hook for the federal government 
in applying state gambling laws to Indian lands and subsuming power 
over criminal prosecutions for violations of the IGRA. 
3. Tribal Sovereign Immunity under the IGRA 
Following the enactment of the IGRA, a three-way circuit split 
developed around the issue of whether or not the statute abrogates 
tribal sovereign immunity and thus, the ability of states to regulate 
gambling activities of sovereign Indian tribes.  The most cautious 
approach has been taken by the Sixth and Eleventh Circuits, which 
have determined that the IGRA only abrogates sovereign immunity 
when the situation at issue is covered by an express provision of the 
 
narrow category of cases where compliance with IGRA's provisions is at issue and where only 
declaratory or injunctive relief is sought.”); Cabazon Band of Mission Indians v. Wilson, 124 
F.3d 1050, 1056 (9th Cir. 1997) (holding that the “IGRA necessarily confers jurisdiction to the 
federal courts [to enforce Tribal-State compacts]”). 
 54.  See Brief for Respondent, supra note 11, at 23 (“Bay Mills agrees that, but for Bay 
Mills’ sovereign immunity, the district court could have properly exercised jurisdiction under 28 
U.S.C.A. § 1331.”).  
 55.  18 U.S.C.A. § 1166(a). 
 56.  Id. § 1166(b).  
 57.  Id. § 1166(d). 
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statute.58 
The Tenth Circuit has adopted a broader interpretation, finding 
that tribal sovereign immunity is abrogated for all cases “where 
compliance with IGRA’s provisions is at issue and where only 
declaratory or injunctive relief is sought.”59 In applying this standard, 
the Tenth Circuit has allowed a state’s claim that a Tribal-State 
compact was invalid to proceed after finding that the tribe’s sovereign 
immunity had been abrogated by the IGRA.60 
A middle position, taken by the Seventh Circuit, holds that the 
IGRA abrogates tribal sovereign immunity “so long as the alleged 
[violation of the Tribal-State compact] relates to one of [the] seven 
items [listed in § 2710(d)(3)(C)(i–vii)].”61 In this way, the Seventh 
Circuit captures the middle ground between the wide reach of the 




 58.  Bay Mills broadly held that immunity is abrogated by § 2710(d)(7)(A)(ii) only when 
“all of its textual pre-requisites” are met, Bay Mills Indian Cmty., 695 F.3d at 414, namely: (1) 
the plaintiff is a state or Indian tribe; (2) the suit seeks to enjoin class III gaming activity; (3) the 
gaming activity is located on Indian lands; (4) the gaming activity violates the Tribal-State 
compact; and (5) the Tribal-State compact is in effect, see 25 U.S.C.A. § 2710(d)(7)(A)(ii) (West 
2014); see also Florida v. Seminole Tribe of Fla., 181 F.3d 1237, 1242 (11th Cir. 1999) (“Congress 
abrogated tribal immunity only in the narrow circumstance in which a tribe conducts class III 
gaming in violation of an existing Tribal–State compact.”).   
 59.  Mescalero Apache Tribe v. New Mexico, 131 F.3d 1379, 1385 (10th Cir. 1997).  
 60.  Id. at 1380–86.  
 61.  See Wisconsin v. Ho-Chunk Nation, 512 F.3d 921, 933–34 (7th Cir. 2008) (holding that 
abrogation of tribal sovereign immunity under the IGRA reached claims regarding any of the 
seven issues that can be discussed in the Tribal-State compact). The seven issues, as provided by 
statute, are: 
“(i) the application of the criminal and civil laws and regulations of the Indian tribe or 
the State that are directly related to, and necessary for, the licensing of such activity; 
(ii) the allocation of criminal and civil jurisdiction between the State and the Indian 
tribe necessary for the enforcement of such laws and regulations; (iii) the assessment 
by the State of such activities in such amounts as are necessary to defray the costs of 
regulating such activity; (iv) taxation by the Indian tribe of such activity in amounts 
comparable to amounts assessed by the State for comparable activities; (v) remedies 
for breach of contract; (vi) standards for the operation of such activity and 
maintenance of the gaming facility, including licensing; and (vii) any other subjects 
that are directly related to the operation of gaming activities.”  
Id. (citing 25 U.S.C. § 2710(d)(3)(C)(i-vii) (2006)). 
 62.  See Bays Mills Indian Cmty., 695 F.3d at 414; Ho-Chunk Nation, 512 F.3d at 933–34; 
Florida v. Seminole Tribe of Fla., 181 F.3d 1237, 1242 (11th Cir. 1999); Mescalero Apache Tribe, 
131 F.3d at 1385–86; see also supra note 58 and accompanying text. 
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IV. APPELLATE COURT HOLDING 
The Sixth Circuit divided consideration of the case into two issues: 
(1) whether the federal courts have subject matter jurisdiction to issue 
an injunction against a tribal casino located off of Indian lands,63 and 
(2) whether tribal sovereign immunity prevents suit against a tribe for 
gambling activity occurring off of Indian lands.64 But before 
considering either of these questions, the court noted the central 
conflict of the underlying case is whether the Vanderbilt casino is 
located on Indian lands.65 The court noted the irony of making this 
determination: if the casino is on Indian lands, then Michigan will 
have standing but will not be able to show injury; if the casino is not 
on Indian lands, the merit of the claim is clear but jurisdiction is 
arguably invalidated.66 Because the trier of fact must determine this 
issue,67 the appellate court proceeded assuming the plaintiffs’ claim 
that the casino is not located on Indian land.68 
A. Subject Matter Jurisdiction 
To determine whether the federal courts have subject matter 
jurisdiction over Bay Mills, the court examined Michigan’s argument 
that there are two possible jurisdictional hooks: (1) § 
2710(d)(7)(A)(ii) of the IGRA69 and (2) federal question jurisdiction 
per 28 U.S.C.A. § 1331.70 
The jurisdictional element of the IGRA gives the federal courts 
jurisdiction over “any cause of action initiated by a State or Indian 
tribe to enjoin a class III gaming activity located on Indian lands and 
conducted in violation of any Tribal-State compact . . . that is in 
effect.”71 The court broke this requirement down into five necessary 
elements: (1) the plaintiff is a state or Indian tribe; (2) the suit seeks 
to enjoin class III gaming activity; (3) the gaming activity is located on 
Indian lands; (4) the gaming activity violates the Tribal-State compact; 
 
 63.  Bay Mills Indian Cmty., 695 F.3d at 411–12. 
 64.  Id. at 413–14.  
 65.  Id. at 412.  
 66.  See id. at 412 (“[I]f the Vanderbilt casino is not located on Indian lands, there is no 
jurisdiction for the plaintiffs' claims; if the casino is located on Indian lands, its operation does 
not violate the compact, which means the claims are meritless.”).  
 67.  Id.  
 68.  Id. at 413.  
 69.  Id. at 411. 
 70.  Id. at 412.  
 71.  25 U.S.C.A. § 2710(d)(7)(A)(ii) (West 2014).  
JEWITT 4.1.2014 FINAL (DO NOT DELETE) 4/16/2014  8:00 PM 
172 DUKE JOURNAL OF CONSTITUTIONAL LAW & PUBLIC POLICY SIDEBAR [VOL. 9 
and (5) the Tribal-State compact is in effect.72 
 
 
The Sixth Circuit found that Michigan’s allegations do not fulfill 
the third requirement—that the gaming activity is located on Indian 
lands.73 However, the court determined that federal question 
jurisdiction attaches as “the claims ‘arise under’ federal law because 
they ‘implicate significant federal issues.’”74 According to the court, 
this jurisdictional hook is appropriate because there is no reason to 
believe that Congress would prefer that state courts dispose of these 
issues.75 
B. Tribal Sovereign Immunity 
Despite holding that federal question jurisdiction applies,76 the 
Sixth Circuit determined that tribal sovereign immunity barred the 
district court from issuing an injunction.77 The court began its analysis 
with the general maxim that “as a matter of federal law, Indian tribes 
are immune from suit except in specific, limited circumstances.”78 Then 
the court discussed the very limited circumstances in which immunity 
can be abrogated, leaning heavily on the requirements of an 
“unequivocal” expression of Congress and “clear” waiver by the tribe 
itself.79 
With this analytical mindset and framework in place, the court 
dismantled Michigan’s three arguments, presented as follows:  (1) 
Congress abrogated tribal immunity in § 2710(d)(7)(A)(ii) of the 
IGRA or alternatively, in § 1166;80 (2) Bay Mills waived immunity 
through its own gaming ordinance;81 and (3) without an abrogation of 
immunity the state will have no remedy against Bay Mills.82 
 
 72.  Bay Mills Indian Cmty., 695 F.3d at 412. 
 73.  Id.  
 74.  Id. at 413 (quoting Grable & Sons Metal Prods., Inc. v. Darue Eng’g, 545 U.S. 308, 312 
(2005)).  
 75.  Id.  
 76.  Id.  
 77.  See id. at 413–17 (determining that Bay Mill’s tribal sovereign immunity as to this kind 
of action has not been abrogated by either Congress or the tribe itself).  
 78.  Id. at 413–14 (citing Kiowa Tribe of Okla. v. Mfg. Techs., Inc., 523 U.S. 751, 754 
(1998)). 
 79.  Id. at 414. 
 80.  Id. at 414–15.  
 81.  Id. at 415–16.  
 82.  Id. at 416.  
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As to the first argument, the court relied on its earlier 
determination that § 2710 requires five necessary elements. The panel 
determined that Congress intended to abrogate tribal sovereign 
immunity only in situations when all five elements are met. Thus, 
where one or more of the elements is not met, no abrogation is 
implied.83 This clearly aligns with the Eleventh Circuit, which 
determined in Florida v. Seminole Tribe of Florida84 that Congress 
does not broadly abrogate tribal sovereign immunity in the IGRA.85 
Second, the court dismissed Michigan’s claim that Bay Mills 
waived immunity in the Tribal-State compact as a “junk drawer 
argument.”86 The opinion points out that the waiver contained in the 
compact only applies to the Bay Mills Gaming Commission, not the 
actual tribe. Furthermore, another provision of the compact expressly 
maintains tribal sovereign immunity.87 
Finally, the court addressed the fear expressed by Michigan that, 
without the ability to enjoin Bay Mills in federal court, the State 
would be left without a remedy for behavior it believes violates state 
and federal law.88 The court indicates three courses of action available 
to the State: (1) requesting that the federal government bring an 
action against the tribe; (2) applying non-discriminatory laws to Bay 
Mills members at the Vanderbilt casino; (3) and bringing an action 






 83.  Id. at 414.  
84.    181 F.3d 1237 (11th Cir. 1999). 
 85.  Id. at 1241–42. (observing that congressional abrogation of sovereign immunity occurs 
only where statutory language expresses an intent to subject a tribe to suit and that IGRA 
authorizes such suits “to enjoin a class III gaming activity located on Indian lands and 
conducted in violation of any Tribal-State compact”) (citations omitted).  
 86.  Bay Mills Indian Cmty., 695 F.3d at 416. 
 87.  Id.  
 88.  Id.  
 89.  Id.  
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V. ARGUMENTS 
A. The State of Michigan’s Arguments 
Michigan principally argues90 that Bay Mills is not shielded by 
tribal sovereign immunity for two reasons.91 First, that under IGRA 
Congress intended to abrogate tribal sovereign immunity regardless 
of the location of the class III gaming activity.92 In support of this 
argument Michigan claims that the inclusion of § 1166 in the IGRA, 
providing that “all State laws pertaining to . . . gambling . . . shall apply 
in Indian country in the same manner and to the same extent as such 
laws apply elsewhere in the State,”93 indicates that Congress wanted 
the states to be able to seek injunctive action against illegal class III 
gaming on either Indian or state lands.94 
Furthermore, Michigan argues that interpreting the term “Indian 
lands” in § 2710(d)(7)(A)(ii) as excluding any regulation of gambling 
occurring on lands over which a state has jurisdiction is problematic. 
Michigan claims this interpretation would limit state control over 
Indian gaming by removing a state’s authority over gaming occurring 
off of Indian lands.95 Michigan argues this result is contrary to the 
intent of Congress in passing the IGRA, which was to give states 
authority over Indian gambling in the wake of the Cabazon decision.96 
The final point Michigan makes as to Congress’s intent is that in 
passing the IGRA, it would be “inconceivable that Congress intended 
to give states a greater ability to deal with illegal gaming on Indian 




 90.  Michigan makes two additional arguments: (1)  the district court has jurisdiction to 
issue an injunction through either § 2710(d)(7)(A)(ii) or federal question jurisdiction, and (2) 
the gaming activity in question occurred on Indian lands as the Vanderbilt casino was 
administered from tribal offices on the Bay Mills reservation. However, neither argument will 
be considered in this commentary as they do not cut to the core question about tribal sovereign 
immunity.  
 91.  Brief for Petitioner, supra note 4, at 25–27. 
 92.  Id. at 25.  
 93.  18 U.S.C.A. § 1166 (West 2014). 
 94.  See Brief for Petitioner, supra note 4, at 26 (“It is not plausible that Congress intended 
that a state would be able to bring a civil suit to enforce anti-gambling laws in Indian country 
but be unable to do so on sovereign state lands.”).  
 95.  Id. at 27.  
 96.  See id. (“Given [the Cabazon] precedent, it would make complete sense for Congress . 
. . to give States more authority to enforce their public policies against gaming.”).  
 97.  Id. at 28.  
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Michigan’s second argument as to why tribal sovereign immunity 
does not bar an injunction is that a holistic appraisal of the statute 
clearly indicates congressional intent to abrogate tribal sovereign 
immunity.98 This argument springs from the reasoning used in 
Seminole Tribe, in which the Court determined that Congress 
intended to abrogate tribal sovereign immunity against suit from 
Indian tribes through a contextual analysis of the statute.99 
Alternatively, Michigan argues that the Court should find that 
tribal sovereign immunity does not protect tribes participating in 
illegal commercial activities on lands under state jurisdiction.100 This 
argument is based on the fact that the Court has never “considered 
whether a tribe is immune from a suit that has no meaningful nexus to 
the Tribe’s land or its sovereign function.”101 Michigan argues that 
limiting tribal sovereign immunity in this way would align tribal 
sovereign immunity with the development of foreign immunity.102 
B. Bay Mills’s Arguments 
Bay Mills stands on a single fundamental argument:103 tribal 
sovereign immunity bars Michigan’s desired injunction.104 Bay Mills 
frames this argument around the central principle from Kiowa that 
tribal sovereign immunity bars legal action against the tribe unless the 
tribe clearly waives the immunity or Congress expressly abrogates 
it.105 
Bay Mills’s first key point is that it has not waived its tribal 
sovereign immunity in this case.106 This claim is uncontested by 
 
 98.  Id. at 28–29. 
 99.  Id. at 29–30 (citing Seminole Tribe of Florida v. Fla., 517 U.S. 44, 57 (1996)).  
 100.  Id. at 36.  
 101.  Kiowa Tribe of Okla. v. Mfg. Techs. Inc., 523 U.S. 751, 764 (1998) (Stevens, J., 
dissenting).  
 102.  Brief for Petitioner, supra note 4, at 40.  
 103.  Bay Mills raises two arguments before moving to its discussion of tribal sovereign 
immunity: (1) Bay Mills refutes Michigan’s ability to argue that the Vanderbilt casino is in fact a 
class III gaming activity on Indian lands based on its administration from the tribal offices on 
the reservation; and (2) Bay Mills concedes the district court does in fact have federal question 
jurisdiction that, but for tribal sovereign immunity, would give it the power to issue an 
injunction against the Vanderbilt casino. Neither of these arguments will be considered in this 
commentary as neither is probative of the fundamental question regarding tribal sovereign 
immunity.   
 104.  See Brief for Respondent, supra note 11, at 18 (“Bay Mills is immune from suit.”). 
 105.  See Kiowa Tribe of Okla., 523 U.S. at 751 (“As a matter of federal law, a tribe is 
subject to suit only where Congress has authorized the suit or the tribe has waived its 
immunity.”).  
 106.  Brief for Respondent, supra note 11, at 25.  
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Michigan.107 The second key point is that § 2710 of the IGRA does not 
abrogate Bay Mills’s sovereign immunity in this, or any, scenario.108 
The activities alleged in this case, that Bay Mills engaged in class III 
gambling outside Indian lands, “fall squarely outside the statute’s 
plain terms—and therefore outside the scope of possible 
abrogation.”109 Bay Mills zeros in on the precise, plain language of § 
2710,110 arguing that the provision cannot be treated as a general grant 
of jurisdiction or waiver of immunity.111 This is confirmed by the 
principle that a congressional abrogation of tribal sovereign immunity 
must be “clearly discernable from the statutory text.”112 Bay Mills 
therefore argues that § 2710 can only be seen as waiving or abrogating 
immunity in “a cause of action initiated by a State or Indian tribe to 
enjoin a class III gaming activity located on Indian lands and 
conducted in violation of any Tribal State compact . . . that is in 
effect.”113 Bay Mills argues that the “‘on Indian lands’ limitation was 
no accidental insertion” by Congress. Rather, Congress intended the 
IGRA to deal with the issue of gambling occurring on Indian lands 
because any other gaming is a matter for state rather than federal 
law.114 
Bay Mills concludes its argument with two important 
considerations for the Court. First, abrogating tribal sovereign 
immunity here would be a departure from longstanding precedent, 
which squarely favors maintaining tribal sovereign immunity.115 
Second, a wide variety of enforcement mechanisms remain open to 




 107.  Id.  
 108.  Id. at 25–26.  
 109.  Id. at 26.  
 110.  See id. (“The precision of the language in section 2710(d)(7)(A)(ii) is striking. It does 
not create a general cause of action for any ‘violation’ of the IGRA.”).  
 111.  Id.  
 112.  Id. at 27 (citing FAA v. Cooper, 132 S. Ct. 1441, 1448 (2012)).  
 113.  Id.  
 114.  Id. at 28.  
 115.  See id. at 34–53 (explaining that the integrity of tribal sovereign immunity doctrine was 
confirmed by the Court as recently as 1998 in Kiowa, as well as giving an overview of the deep 
historical and legal roots of tribal sovereign immunity reaching back to the colonial period and 
the Marshall Court).   
 116.  Id. at 53–54.  
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VI. ANALYSIS 
It is clear, from a conservative, textual, or doctrinal approach that 
Bay Mills has managed to present the much more compelling 
argument. By turning to the text and construction of § 
2710(d)(7)(A)(ii), Bay Mills’s analysis stays faithful to the language of 
the statute.117 Bay Mills finds justification for this approach in the 
established interpretive method traditionally required for the analysis 
of tribal sovereign immunity issues—that a congressional abrogation 
of immunity must be express and cannot be implied.118 Through this 
analysis, Bay Mills shows that, in this case, it has retained tribal 
sovereign immunity.119 This starkly contrasts with Michigan’s 
arguments, which request the Court to turn to unsupported ideas 
about congressional intent and adopt a broad interpretation of 
IGRA.120 Such a request on an issue that has consistently merited such 
a careful and cautious approach as tribal sovereign immunity is 
indicative of Michigan’s overall lack of textual, precedential, or 
legislative support for stronger claims. Furthermore, the argument for 
a broad reading of the statute is undermined by both the requirement 
of express abrogation or waiver,121 and the Court’s continued 
deference to the legislative power of Congress on this issue.122 Rather 
than taking stabs at Congress’s intent, it would be far better for the 
Court to take a plain-meaning approach to interpreting the IGRA 




 117.  See id. at 25–27 (making an argument for a plain language interpretation of § 
2710(d)(7)(A)(ii)).  
 118.  See id. (“Only two exceptions exist to the broad rule of immunity. One is that a tribe 
may waive its immunity, and the second is that Congress may abrogate a tribe’s immunity. In 
either case, the dissolution of tribal immunity must be unequivocally expressed . . . .”).  
 119.  See id. at 25–26 (“Even if section 2710(d)(7)(A)(ii) abrogates tribal sovereign 
immunity in some circumstances, that abrogation clearly does not apply here. Michigan’s claims 
fall squarely outside the statute’s plain terms—and therefore outside the scope of any possible 
abrogation. Bay Mills retains its immunity from suit.”).  
 120.  See Brief for Petitioner, supra note 4, at 19 (“When examining IGRA as a whole (i.e., 
not focusing exclusively on § 2710), it is immediately apparent that Congress understood and 
expected that a state could enforce its gaming laws in federal court against a tribe engaged in 
off-reservation gaming.”) (citation omitted).   
 121.  Federal Aviation Administration v. Cooper, 132 S. Ct. 1441, 1448 (2012).  
 122.  See Seielstad, supra note 1, at 665–66 (“In Kiowa Tribe of Oklahoma v. Manufacturing 
Technologies Inc., the Court . . . ‘deffer[ed] to the role Congress may wish to exercise in this 
important judgment’ . . . . The Supreme Court has not altered the Court’s fundamental position 
regarding tribal immunity even as is addressed the issue in context of a specific contractual 
provision.”).  
JEWITT 4.1.2014 FINAL (DO NOT DELETE) 4/16/2014  8:00 PM 
178 DUKE JOURNAL OF CONSTITUTIONAL LAW & PUBLIC POLICY SIDEBAR [VOL. 9 
With Michigan’s arguments largely meritless, the Court’s only 
option for finding in favor of Michigan would be to override 
precedent and hold that “tribes have no sovereign immunity from 
suits alleging illegal commercial gaming occurring on state lands.”123 
Although this argument seems to gain traction in terms of the public 
policy—it seems strange that a state cannot enjoin gambling on land 
within its jurisdiction—the argument is not compelling enough to 
override nearly two centuries of precedent on tribal sovereign 
immunity.124 The public policy considerations are further diminished 
when considering that Congress is the traditional speaker on tribal 
sovereign immunity and it remains free to act on the issue.125 The 
public policy risk for Michigan does not rise to such a level that the 
Court should subsume the exclusive power of Congress in legislating 
on tribal sovereign immunity. 
Considering the statutory, precedential, and legislative issues in 
play, the Court should find in favor of Bay Mills. 
VII. CONCLUSION 
Bay Mills is an example of the long arm of history, reaching from 
the very origins of the United States into modern jurisprudence and 
molding modern cases. It is readily apparent from Bay Mills’s 
arguments that tribal sovereign immunity bars the district court from 
issuing an injunction in this case. The only question is whether the 
Supreme Court will embrace Michigan’s argument—abandoning 
precedent and abrogating tribal sovereign immunity in a new 
manner.126 Administrative inconvenience for Michigan, even if in 
pursuit of a legitimate interest, is not reason enough to truncate the 
doctrine of tribal sovereign immunity. 
 
 
 123.  Brief for Petitioner, supra note 4, at 19.  
 124.  See Seielstad, supra note 1, at 675 (“[T]he United States generally granted foreign 
sovereigns immunity from suit in the courts of this country. As with states and the federal 
government, the federal judiciary and Congress also have recognized the doctrine of sovereign 
immunity with respect to foreign nations and the American Indian tribes.”).  
 125.  See id. at 684 (“The Constitution granted to Congress—and only to Congress—the 
power to ‘regulate Commerce with the Indian tribes.’”).  
 126.  See Brief for Petitioner, supra note 4, at 19 (“In the alternative, the Court should 
confirm that tribes have no sovereign immunity from suits alleging illegal commercial gaming 
occurring on state lands.”).  
